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DE FOREST BILLYOU t
IT has long been accepted that secured creditors of a corporation
may not always enforce their security in conformity with terms pre-
viously accepted by the borrower. 1 Since 1879 English and Canadian
indentures have frequently contained provisions, commonly called ma-
jority clauses, enabling a specified percentage of the security holders to
modify the rights of the class, including the principal and interest obli-
gation of the corporate debtor.2 Their use has become so common that
a commentator on the English practice states that ". . . the draftsman
who omits to insert some such provision runs the risk of being accused
of neglecting the best interests of the debenture [holderl . . .
With rare exceptions, majority clauses allowing modification of the
principal and interest obligations of a corporate debtor were not ac-
cepted in the United States until recent insistence by the ICC that
they be included in the new mortgages of railroads emerging from Sec-
tion 77 reorganization. The Commission, in addition, has pressed for
enactment of a statute which, in effect, would incorporate such a clause
in most railroad obligations. There is at least inadequate understanding
of the incidents and operation of such clauses in the United States.
This article seeks to ameliorate the inadequacy.
ENGLISH AND CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
The source of the English and Canadian majority clauses can prob-
ably be traced to clauses included in a trust deed prepared by Francis
Beaufort Palmer in 1879 4 and, two years later, reproduced in a revision
of his compilation of Company Precedents. Soon thereafter such clauses
appeared in many English and Canadian trust deeds and indentures.6
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. This is particularly true of such "public" corporations as transportation compan-
ies. See facon & Western R.R. v. Parker, 9 Ga. 377, 393 (1851) (Lumpdn, J.) ; Gates
v. Boston & N. Y. Air Line R.R., 53 Conn. 333, 342, 5 At. 695, 693 (1885) ; Philadelphia
& Lewes Transp. Co., 114 Fed. 403 (E.D. Pa. 1902) ; 2 BONBRIGHT, JUDICIAL VALUATION.;
850 (1937).
2. See 3 PALmER, COMPANY PRECEDENTS c. xLx (15th ed. 1933); Fraser, Rcorgan-
ization of Companies in Canada, 27 CoL. L. REv. 932, 936-49 (19-7) ; IVEGR= AsT, CA.-
ADiAx ComPAxNis 654-5 (1931). In British and Canadian legal parlance a "debenture"
is a secured obligation, equivalent to a bond.
3. 3 PALME,, COMPANY PRECEDENTS 158 (14th ed. 1933).
4. This trust deed secured debentures of the New Zealand Agricultural Co., Ltd.
The clauses were utilized in 1885 and in 1886 were involved in litigation.
5. PALmE , ComPAxY PRacEDrENs 271 (2d ed. 1881).
6. E.g., see the provisions of an 1881 indenture described in In Re The Dominion of
Canada Freehold Estate & Timber Co., 55 L.T.R. (x.s.) 347 (CIL Div. 1886).
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As cases involving the use or attempted use of these clauses were de-
cided, and new problems or possibilities foreseen, the clause was modi-
fied so that today in England and in Canada it is possible, under an
appropriately drafted clause,7 for debenture holder majorities to author-
ize the creation of a prior lien,8 and the exchange of a secured obligation
for an equity interest 9 and to assent to a thorough reorganization with
no provision for dissenters other than pro rata participation.1" The
courts, however, have been vigilant to see that the attempted action
is clearly in conformity with the indenture provision," that those cast-
ing votes are motivated by interests of the class and not by adverse
interests 12 or collateral matters," and that subsequent corporate action
purporting to be in conformity with the resolution does in fact so con-
form. 14
UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE
Prior to 1930 majority clauses permitting modification of principal
and interest obligations of the debtor saw relatively little use in the
United States, 15 and today, as then, the typical indenture expressly
provides that the corporate obligation to pay principal and interest
7. For recent English and Canadian forms of the clause see 3 PALMER, COMPANY
PRECEDENTS 292-3, 355-60 (15th ed. 1938); FRASER, CANADIAN COMPANY FOR's 731-3
(2d ed. 1927) ; SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACrIvIrv,
PERSONNEL AND FuNcTioNs OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION CoMIirrEEs, pt. V1,
138-43 (1936).
8. In re The Dominion of Canada Freehold Estate & Timber Co., 55 L.T.R. (N.s.)
347 (Ch. Div. 1886) ; Follit v. Eddystone Granite Quarries, [1892] 3 Ch. 75; Sneath v.
Valley Gold, Ltd., [1893] 1 Ch. 477.
9. Mercantile Investment and General Trust Co. v. River Plate Trust, Loan, and
Agency Co., [1894] 1 Ch. 578; Sneath v. Valley Gold, Ltd., [1893] 1 Ch. 477; In re
Labuan & Borneo Ltd., 18 T.L.R. 216 (1901); Nat'l Trust Co. v. Maritime Coal, Ry.
& Power Co., [1930] 2 D.L.R. 309 (N.S. Sup. Ct.); cf. In re Joseph Stocks and Co,,
26 T.L.R. 41 (1909) (exchange of redeemable for unredeemable shares); In re Empire
Mining Co., 44 Ch. D. 402 (1890) (application under the Companies Act).
10. Fraser, supra note 2, at 939.
11. British America Nickel Corp. v. W. J. O'Brien, Ltd., [1927] A.C. 369; Hoy
v. The Swedish & Norwegian Ry. Co., 5 T.L.R. 460 (Ct. of App. 1889).
12. In re New York Taxicab Co., [1913] 1 Ch. 1 (1912) (sale of corporate assets
authorized by debenture holders, proceeds to be used to purchase those debentures tendered
to the company at the lowest prices, enjoined).
13. British America Nickel Corp. v. M. J. O'Brien, Ltd., [1927] A.C. 369 (vote cast
for the best interest of the voting security holder and not for the best interest of the voting
class).
14. Re B. C. Portland Cement Co., [1915] 22 D.L.R. 609 (B.C. Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
[1916] 27 D.L.R. 726 (B.C. Ct. of App.).
15. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Ccrtain Developments of the Last De-




when due may be compromised or modified only by consent of each
bondholder. 16
Failure to accept the English type of majority clause in the United
States may be attributed to several factors. The New York Stock Ex-
change has been reluctant to grant listing to bonds subject to modifi-
cation as to principal or interest," and the negotiable character of such
bonds in each of the forty-eight states is not entirely clear.b' This
combination of circumstances deterred large issuers from proposing,
and bankers from underwriting, securities subject to such clauses.1"
This in turn may have set a style followed by smaller issuers. The
difference in attitude is carried so far that Canadian securities, while
normally subject to such a clause, if intended to be sold or listed in the
United States are devoid of majority clauses. '
Our courts, in the few decided cases, have indicated that under an
appropriately drafted clause the same possibilities are available to
bondholder majorities as in England and Canada,2 but subject to simi-
lar restrictions. 22
NEGOTIABILITY OF BoNDs SUBJECT TO 'MAJORITY CLAUSES
It is deemed desirable that corporate bonds have the attributes of
negotiable instruments, for transfer can then be more readily accom-
plished and such a bond is more readily salable. This desirability is re-
16. See the provisions reproduced in SEC, op. dt. supra note 7, pt. v, at 135-7. See
also id., pt. m, at 226.
17. The attitude of the Exchange is expressed in terms of an insistence that listed
securities be negotiable, cf. STETsoN, PREPAR AmN oF CoRpoRATz Bo Ds, Mo20aAG.s,
COL.ATERAL TRUSTS, AND DFBNruF.rE IxNnxTurs, iN SoomE LEGAL PHASEs OF Conro.wvz
FIXANcING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 72 (1917). Hoxvever, since passage of the
Hofstadter Act in 1926, see note 36 in!ra, the concern really is not as to the aspects of
negotiability, but as to the integrity of the listed obligation. Cf. Steffen and Russell, The
Negotiabiity of Corporate Bonds, 41 YALz L. J. 799, 827 n.122 (1932).
18. See pp. 597-602 infra.
19. But cf. Indenture, United States Steel Corp., Art. 7 (1903) and the listed bonds
described in Chalmers v. Nederlandsch Ameriansche, 36 N.Y.S.2d 717 (City Ct. 1942).
20. E.g. Indenture, Hiram Walker-Goodeham & Worts, Ltd. and Hiram Walker &
Sons, Inc. to Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, Art. 10 (1946).
21. See pp. 595-6 supra. Application of Colonial Trust Co., 67 N.Y.S2d 534 (Sup.Ct.
1946) (authorizing creation of prior lien); Chalmers v. Nederlandsch Americaansche,
36 N.Y.S.2d 717 (City Ct. 1942) (exchange of secured obligation for equity interest);
cf. Sage v. Central R.R., 99 U.S. 334 (1878) (assent to thorough reorganization vithout
court approval of plan, and with no provision for dissenters other than pro rata participa-
tion).
22. Rothschild v. Jefferson Hotel Co., 56 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Mo. 1944) (contended
action must dearly conform to indenture provision) ; Dunham v. Omaha & C.B. Street
Ry., 25 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) (same); Vogelstein v. Athletic Mining Co., 192
SMW. 760 (Mo. App. 1917) (same) ; cf. McClelland v Norfolk Southern R.R. 110 N.Y.
469, 18 N.E. 237 (1888) ; see Vogelstein v. Athletic Mining Co., 192 S.W. 760, 763 (Mo.
App. 1917) (those voting must not be motivated by adverse interests) ; Hac:ettstovn Na-
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flected in the fact that registered bonds, not transferable by mere de-
livery, typically sell at a discount from the price of bearer bonds of the
same issue.2 3 Utility of majority clauses depends greatly on the concept
of negotiability, for related to that concept is the question whether a
purchaser of such a bond subsequent to, and without notice of, modifi-
cation may be held to the terms of the modification. In the case of
recent railroad bonds, draftsmen, confident that the limited modifica-
tion provision would not impair negotiability under NIL standards,
have summarized the provision on the bond itself 24 and have not re-
lied on a mere general clause referring to the mortgage. As a result a
purchaser is placed on notice of the possibility of past modification.
However, wheri the scope of majority action is broader, such as
providing for reduction of principal and exchange of securities, a situ-
ation where a draftsman has less reason to be confident as to compliance
with NIL standards, bonds have usually contained little other than
conventional reference clauses.2 5 In such cases it would be difficult to
hold a purchaser 'subsequent to, and without notice of, modification,
to the terms of the modification. The obligor would be faced with the
general problem of estoppel based on the attitude that bond clauses
referring in general terms to the mortgage are deemed to refer to the
mortgage only for the purpose of disclosing details of security rights.20
If such a purchaser should not be bound to the proposal the whole
attempt at modification might be a failure, unless the form of assent
were sufficiently broad. To avoid preferential treatment, a court might
well find the assent was only to those modifications that would be
binding on all subsequent as well as present bondholders. ,
tional Bank v. D.G. Yuengling Brewing Co., 74 Fed. 110 (C.C.A. 2d 1896) (same: col-
lateral interests).
23. See Steffen and Russell, Registered Bonds and Negotiability, 47 HAZv. L, Rav.
741, 742 (1934).
24. See the forms of bonds set forth in the first mortgages. Chi. M. St. P. & PR.R.
5 (1945); Chi. Ind. & L. Ry. 5-6 (1945); Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R. 6-7 (1947);
Seaboard Air Line R.R. 6 (1947) ; but cf. St. L. & S.F. Ry. 5-6 (1946).
25. See Chalmers v. Nederlandsch Amerikaansche, 36 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720 (City Ct.
1942): "As in the Trust Indenture provided, such [bondholders] meeting may authorize
the Trustee to grant the Company delay in connection with any payment due to the
Bondholders and to take other action in the interests of the Bondholders." In Canada,
majority clauses applicable to debentures hre often summarized in conditions attached to
the debentures.
26. Manning v. Norfolk So. R.R., 29 Fed. 838 (C.C.E.D.Va.1887); Cunningham
v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 238 App. Div. 624, 625, 265 N.Y. Supp. 256, 258 (1st Dep't 1933),
aff'd witwut oplnion, 263 N.Y. 671, 189 N.E. 750 (1934) : "This bond is one of an issue
. . . secured by an Indenture . . . to which Indenture reference is hereby made for a
statement of the rights of the holders of said bonds." Note, 33 MIcH. L. REv. 604, 605-6
(1935) ; cf. Stetson, op. cit. supra. note 17 at 16-7.
27: But cf. the action of the District Court, according to a preference to non-assenters,
in It re.Los Angeles Lumber Co., 46 F. Supp. 77, 89 (S.D. Cal. 1941). See note 76 infra.
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There has been much concern in the United States over the incidents
of negotiability accorded corporate bonds.23 In England and Canada
the Bills of Exchange Act 2 is not applicable to corporate bonds, and
negotiable character has been accorded by judicial decisions recognizing
that such bonds in fact were treated by businessmen as negotiable.- 5
Since, prior to drafting of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law,
our courts accorded aspects of negotiability to corporate bonds 31 there
was subsequently much concern 32 over the decisions indicating these
bonds were subject to the supposedly more rigid requirements of the
Negotiable Instruments Law. 33 In diverse ways, however, some of
these bonds have been accorded incidents of negotiability. Whether,
in a given jurisdiction, according such incidents is dependent on the
NIL 34 as opposed to the more flexible common law 35 or special statu-
tory provisions specifically applicable to corporate bonds, ' might, in
the case of bonds subject to majority action, be crucial, since such
bonds, seemingly, are in open defiance of the NIL provision that an
instrument to be negotiable must ". . . contain an unconditional prom-
28. Steffen and Russell, supra note 17; Note, 42 HAnV. L. Rrv. 115. See Banks,
Indenture Securities and The Barkley Bill, 48 YALE L. J. 533, 565 n.139 (1939).
29. 45 & 46 Vicr., c. 61 (1882); CAAmDA REv. STAT., c. 16 (1927); See President
and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 48, 150 N.E. 594, 597 (1926).
30. Edelstein v. Schuler & Co., [1902] 2 K.B. 144; Bechuanaland Exploration Co.
v. London Trading Bank, Ltd., [1898] 2 Q.B. 658.
31. Mercer County v. Hacket, 1 Wall. 83 (U.S. 1863); Brainerd v. New York and
Harlem R.R., 25 N.Y. 496 (1862); SHoar, RAUiWAy BONDS AND MOraGAGES 78 (1897).
32. Steffen and Russell, supra note 17 passim; Note, 25 Co. L. Rm-v 71 (1925).
33. Following enactment of the NIL, courts expressed a reluctance to regard as ne-
gotiable under common law, or law merchant, modern instruments which did not meet
the supposed specificity of the NIL. President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Mor-
gan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926) (interim certificates); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Maryland v. Andrews, 244 Mich. 159, 221 N.V. 114 (1928) (equipment trust certif-
icates) ; Manker v. American Savings Bank & Trust Co., 131 Wash. 430, 230 Pac. 405
(1924) (improvement assessment bonds).
34. E.g., Enoch v. Brandon, 249 N. Y. 263, 266, 164 N.E. 45, 46 (1928); fanker
v. American Savings Bank & Trust Co., 131 Wash. 430, 230 N.A. 406 (1924).
35. E.g., see cases cited notes 30 and 31 supra
36. In New York, subsequent to a 1926 decision indicating that interim certificates
were not negotiable since they failed to meet the requirements of the NIL, President &
Directors of the Manhattan Co., 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926), the legislature en-
acted the Hofstadter Act amending the Personal Property Law and according some
of the consequences of negotiability to security receipts and equipment trust certificates,
as defined, if they provided that title might pass by delivery, N.Y. Laws 1926, c. 704; see
Legis., 26 Cor. L. Rsv. 884 (1926). Again, in 1930, subsequent to a decision which sug-
gested that in order to be accorded consequences of negotiability corporate bonds would
be expected to meet NIL requirements, Enoch v. Brandon, 249 N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45
(1928), the legislature added corporate bonds, as defined, to the instruments to be ac-
corded some of the consequences of negotiability. N.Y. Laws 1930, c. 630; see Comment,
40 YALE L. J. 261 (1930); N.Y. PEns. PRoP- LAw, Art. 8. However, since the statute
is not part of the NIL, compliance does not necessarily result in acquisition of all the
1948]-
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ise ... to pay a sum certain in money . .. [and] be payable on de-
mand, or at a fixed or determinable future time. ... 1
Some light is thrown on this problem by Enoch v. Brandon,33 a lead-
ing case on applicability of the NIL to corporate bonds. The suit was
instituted to recover the value of a bond of a Canadian corporation
stolen from the plaintiff in New York and there acquired by defendant
as an innocent purchaser for value and later sold by him. Each bond,
unconditional on its face and payable in Montreal or New York, stated
that it was ". . . entitled to the benefits and subject to the provisions
of [the] . ..mortgage and deed of trust dated as of November 1st,
1921. . ... This deed of trust, executed in Canada, with a Quebec
bank as trustee, contained a majority clause similar to those commonly
found in Canadian indentures 4°-which have never been held by Cana-
dian courts to impair negotiability. The trial court 41 and the Court
of Appeals 42 gave judgment for the defendant. The opinions strongly
suggest,43 however, that if the nature of the obligation under Canadian
law had been appreciated, and the NIL deemed the applicable stand-
ard, attributes of negotiability would have been denied to the bond,
and the plaintiff allowed to recover. On the basis of common law, in
characteristics of an NIL complying instrument. Steffen and Russell, supra note 17, at
808.
A similar history lies behind the California statute providing that "Bonds payable to
bearer or holder shall be negotiable, notwithstanding any condition contained therein or
in the mortgage, deed of trust or other instrument securing the same." 1 CAL. GEN. LAWS,
Act. 860 (Deering,1944), and the Minnesota statute providing that "Any bond . . . se-
cured by a mortgage . . . when otherwise so drawn as to fall under and within the pro-
visions of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act shall be deemed to be a negotiable
instrument . .. whether or not the terms of the mortgage . . . purport to be incorpo-
rated therein or made a part thereof . . ." 21 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 355.041 (West 1947).
37. NEGoTIMABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §1(2), (3); JONES, CORPORATE BONDS AND
MORTGAGES § 191 (2d ed. 1890); see McClelland v. Norfolk Southern MR., 110 N.Y. 469,
475-6, 18 N.E. 258, 260 (1888) (common alaw). The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
has urged that a security whose maturity may be extended by majority action does not
really represent a debt, periodic payments on which may be deductable'as interest. See
Commissioner v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 141 F.2d 467, 470 (C.C.A. 1st 1943), Brief
for Petitioner, pp. 10-11.
38. 249 N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45 (1928), reversing 224 App. Div. 692, 228 N.Y. Supp.
789 (4th Dep't 1928), reversing 128 Misc. 695, 220 N.Y. Supp. 294 (Sup. Ct. 1927), 29
Co- L. Rv. 365 (1929), 42 HIv. L. REv. 700-(1929), 38 YALE L. J. 825 (1929); Com-
ment, 33 MicH. L. Rv. 604, 605-6 (1935).
39. See Enoch v. Brandon, 128 Misc. 695, 696, 220 N.Y. Supp. 294, 295 (Sup. Ct.
1927), Record on Appeal, Court of Appeals p. 30.
40. This similarity is apparent by comparison of the language of the trust deed, See
Enoch v. Brandon, 128 Misc. 695, 696, 220 N.Y. Supp. 294, 295 (Sup. Ct. 1927), Record
on Appeal, Court of Appeals pp. 33-4, with that of a typical Canadian clause, Fraser,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 731-2.
41. 128 Misc. 695, 220 N.Y. Supp. 294 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
42. 249 N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45 (1928).
43. Cf. Steffen and Russell, supra note 17, at 814, 826.
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the absence of a showing that bankers, brokers, and investors regarded
such Canadian bonds differently from conventional corporate bonds
and carried out their transactions accordingly, it would be most diffi-
cult to deny these bonds attributes of negotiability commonly accorded
negotiable instruments.
44
The most thorough consideration to date given to the negotiable
character, under American law, of bonds subject to majority action,
has probably taken place in drafting the new mortgages of railroads
now emerging from proceedings under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy
Act. Commencing in 1942, the Interstate Commerce Commission, pur-
portedly dissatisfied with then contemporary reorganization procedure,
sought to lay a groundwork for easing future financial difficulties and
for avoiding reorganizations. 45 In approving reorganization plans for
these emerging roads it directed that the new mortgages contain clauses
permitting extension of the principal and interest obligations by action
of specified bondholder majorities.-" Objections were made to the Com-
mission that provision for extensions unlimited in time might impair
negotiability, and it then limited the extendable period. 47 Mortgages
subsequently executed have typically provided that by the vote of
holders of three-quarters of the outstanding bonds there may be post-
ponement of payment of (1) principal for not in excess of twenty years,
and (2) interest payments for not in excess of (a) five years each and
(b) the original, or extended, principal maturity date.4 Postponability
44. See cases cited notes 30, 31 supra.
45. 57th I.C.C. Axx. REP. 76 (1943).
46. For development of the device see Florida East Coast Ry., 252 I.C.C. 423, 470
(1942), 252 I.C.C. 731, 741 (1942), 261 I.C.C. 151, 179-80 (1945); Minn. St. Paul &
S.Ste. M. Ry., 252 I.C.C. 525, 569-70 (1942) ; 252 I.C.C. 615, 629 (1942) ; Denver & Rio
Grande W.R.RP , 254 I.C.C. 5, 39 (1942); Chi. Ind. & L. Ry., 254 I.C.C. 539, 583 (1943);
Chi. Al. St. P. & Pac. R.R., 254 I-C.C. 707, 736 (1943), 257 I.C.C. 223, 225-6, 235, 247
(1944) ; In re Chi. Mr. St. P. & Pac. Ry., 58 F. Supp. 384, 392 (N.D. Ill. 1944) ; Chli.
RI. & Pac. Ry., 257 I.C.C. 265, 289-9 (1944) ; St. L. & S.F. Ry., 257 I.C.C. 399, 415, 425
(1944) ; Mo. Pac. Ry., 257 I.C.C. 479, 530-1 (1944) ; In re Mo. Pac. Ry., 64 F. Supp.
64, 76-7 (RD. Mo. 1945) ; N.Y.S. & W.R.R., 261 I.C.C. 101, 117-3 (1945) ; Central of
Ga. Ry., 261 I.C.C. 263, 326 (1945); St. Johnsbury & L.C. Ry., 261 I.C.C. 563, 573-4
(1945) ; Wisconsin Central Ry., Fin. Doc. No. 14720 at 79 (mimeo. 1947).
Where application has been made by solvent companies for authority for the issue and
sale of bonds the Commission has not suggested that such clauses be included in the new
mortgages. E.g. Pittsburg, Bessemer & Lake Erie R. Bonds, Fin. Doc. No. 15529
(mimeo. 1946). However, the suggestion has been made, in connection with application
for authorization of securities proposed to be issued on termination of receivership pro-
ceedings. E.g. Minn. & St. L. R.R, 254 I.C.C. 513, 521 (1943) (interest only to be post-
poned and not beyond principal maturity date) ; Seaboard Air Line Ry., 261 I.C.C. 69, 704
(1946).
47. See ChK M. St. P. & P. R-R., 257 I.C.C. 223, 225-6, 235 (1944).
48. See First 'Mortgages: Chi. M. St. P. & P. R.R., Art. 19, § 3 (1945); Chi Ind.
& L. Ry., Art. 18, §3 (1945); St. L. S.F. Ry., Art. 16, §6 (1946). These mortgages
were executed by roads just emerging from § 77. The recently executed Denver & Rio
1948]
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of principal and interest payments, as so restricted, would seem to con-
stitute compliance with NIL requirements.4 9
MAJORITY CLAUSES AND SECURTES REGULATION
In the reorganization or salvaging of real estate properties in the
thirties several companies emerged with debts secured by instruments
subject to majority action. 0 This was attributed to dissatisfaction
with the then existing reorganization facilities and the belief that these
modification provisions of the indentures would facilitate future ad-
justment.5 Under some clauses a specified majority could permit the
elimination of bondholders' liens, the sale of property, the extension of
bond maturities, the reduction of interest or consummation of sweep-
ing plans of reorganization-all on a purely voluntary basis. 2 Since all
this could be accomplished without either judicial examination or ap-
proval,5 3 the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1936 expressed its
fear that unsupervised reorganization under such clauses imperiled
minorities. 54 This concern about the potentialities of majority clauses
led to provision in the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 that indentures to
Grande mortgage makes no provision for extension of principal. It provides for exten-
sion of interest and limits extended unpaid fixed and contingent interest payments to, at
any one time, fifteen and five per cent, respectively, of the principal of the bonds. In addi-
tion, prior to, and for the duration of, any extension, provision shall be made so bond-
holders may elect a majority of the Board of Directors. First Mortgage, Denver &
R.G. W. R.R., Art. 19, § 3 (1947).
The prime mortgage of the road that most recently emerged from § 77 while pro-
viding for certain types of modification, expressly provides that no modification may (a)
alter or impair the obligation to pay principal or interest or (b) permit creation of a prior
lien. First & Refunding Mortgage, New York N.H. & H. R.R. 121 (1947).
In one case the mortgage executed by a road just emerging froth equity receivership
provides that by vote of holders of two-thirds of the bonds payment of not in excess
of ten semi-annual interest installments may be postponed to any specified or determinable
date not later than maturity date of principal. First Mortgage, Seaboard Air Line R.R.,
Art. 16, §6 (1946).
49. Negotiability under the NIL is unimpaired although payment be subject to ex-
tension for a stated period. State Bank v. Bilstad, 162 Iowa 433, 136 N.W. 204 (1912)
(one year). See In re Chi. M. St. P. & Pac. R.R., 58 F. Supp. 384, 392 (N.D. Ill. 1944).
50. SE, op. cit. smpra note 7, pt. III, at 225-7. See Rothschild v. Jefferson Hotel
Co., 56 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1944).
51. SEC, op. cit. supra note 7, pt. III, at 225; id. pt. vi, at 146; Notes, 38 Micir. L.
RPv. 63, 67-8 (1939), 27 COL. L. RaV. 579, 584-7 (1927); MCCLELLAND AND Fisnmt,
LAW OF CoRPoRAa BOND ISSUES 824-5 (1937).
52. SEC, op. cit. supra note 7, pt. III, at 226.
53. Id. pt. iiI, at 227. However, in an appropriate case a security holder could (a)
apply to a court to enjoin an improper or fraudulant proposal, e.g., Rothschild v. Jeffer-
son Hotel Co., 56 F.Supp. 315 (E.D. Mo. 1944), or (b) assert his debt claim even after
the modification, e.g., Hackettstown Nat. Bank v. D. G. Yeungling Brewing Co., 74
Fed. 110 (C.C.A. 2d 1896), or (c) assert his security claim against assets transferred
to a reorganized company, cf. Northern Pac. R.R. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
54. SEC, op. cit. supra note 7, pt. In, at 228, pt. vI, at 149-50, pt. vii, at 16-18.
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be qualified under that Act shall provide that the right of a security
holder to receive payment of principal and interest on or after the
respective due dates, shall not be impaired or affected without his con-
sent,55 with the single exception that the indenture may provide that
not less than three-qud.ters of a class of security holders may, on be-
half of all, consent to postponement of any interest payment for a
period not exceeding three years."'
The Commission's fears of the consequences of the unsupervised use
of the clause were not demonic. Since release of its report in 1936, cases
involving use of majority clauses have disclosed instances where, in
securing the vote of security holders, misinformation was supplied ;
or was furnished by biased sources,r5 where votes were cast by those
whose interests were adverse to the class being ballotedj and where
supposedly unbiased fiduciaries participated in the voting and, inad-
vertently or otherwise, acquired a position adverse to their cestuis,
the bondholders."
MAJORITY CLAUSES AND) ABSOLUTE PRIORITY
Through many decades there evolved the judicial requirement that
in corporate reorganization secured creditors must receive satisfaction
55. §316(b), 53 STAT. 1173 (1939), 15 U.S.C. §77ppp(b) (1940).
56. §316(a)(2), 53 STAT. 1172 (1939), 15 U.S.C. §77ppp(a)(2) (1940). See
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. First Petroleum Trust, 67 F. Supp. 859 (D.RPJ. 1946).
While the indenture may also contain provisions whereby a majority of security holders
might, on behalf of a class, preclude the exercise of remedies available to the trustee for
the benefit of that class §316(a) (1), 53 STAT. 1172 (1939), 15 U.S.C. §77ppp(a) (1)
(1940), unless action has been taken under section 316(a) (2) the right of an individual
security holder to enforce the corporate obligation seems unimpaired. H.R. REP. No.
1016, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1939).
Whether or not compliance with the Trust Indenture Act is necessary, corporations
may e perience difficulty in utilizing existing majority clauses, for modifications of se-
curity obligations, such as the extension of maturities with part payment of principal,
may constitute a "sale' of a security requiring registration or approval under applicable
federal or state statutes. Cf. Securities & Exchange Commission v. Associated Gas &
Electric Co. et al., 99 F2d 795 (C.C.A. 2d 1938) (Public Utility Holding Company Act
§ 6(a) ). Majority extension of corporate bonds has been held to be a "rene-.ral" and subject
to payment of the federal stamp tax, Campbell River Timber Co. v. Vierhus, 86 F2d 673
(C.C.A_ 9th 1936), and extension of bonds, with or without nominal payments of principal
has been held to constitute "issuance of a security" requiring LC.C. authorization pur-
suant to section 20(a) of the Transportation Act, Bonds of Minn. & St. L. R.R., 124 I.C.C.
562 (1927) ; San Luis Central R.R. Bonds, 79 I.C.C. 737 (1923) ; Bath & Hammondsport
Bonds, 79 I.C.C. 267 (1923); Erie R.R. Co., Extension Contracts, 65 I.C.C. 131 (1920).
57. Rothschild v. Jefferson Hotel Co., 56 F. Supp. 315, 322-4 (ED. Mo. 1944).
58. See In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 46 F. Supp. 77, 84 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
1941).
59. Rothschild v. Jefferson Hotel Co., 56 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Mo. 1944).
60. See In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 46 F. Supp. 77, 82, 83, 85, 90
(S.D. Cal. 1941) (voting for a plan that failed to recognize greater rights of non-
assenters to previous plan).
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of their claims before equity interests may participate in the reorgan-
ized company,61 a requirement incorporated into some of the federal
reorganization statutes.6 2 Supreme Court decisions of the last decade
have been such that equity interests are on notice that in bankruptcy
reorganization their claims are to be satisfied only after satisfaction
of the claims of senior creditors.63
Inherent in the nature of majority clauses is the fact that, save for
what interests stockholders might be motivated to surrender volun-
tarily, the clauses provide a method for modification of creditor rights
without curtailment of stockholder interests, 4 and it was this inherent
fixity that was thought to mean the end of their use in reorganizations
under the bankruptcy statute.65 Typical of the use of such clauses are
reorganizations completed 66 or attempted 67 which conspicuously fail
61. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115-9 (1939).
62. Group of Investors v. Chi. M. St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 541-2 (1943)
(§ 77) ; Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939) (§ 77B) ; Marine
Harbor Properties Inc. v. Manufacturers Trust Co. 317 U. S. 78, 85 (1942) (chapter x).
63. See cases cited note 62 supra.
64. SEN. REP. No. 1619, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 19 (1938); Hearings before subcom-
inittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Ft. iR. 10,292
75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 35 (1938) ; H. R. RP. No. 1016, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1939) ;
Dodd, The Los Angeles Lumber Products Company Case and its Implications, 53 HAv.
L. REv. 713, 749 (1940). Cf. Securities & Exchange Commission v. United States Realty
& Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940). "The hope of securing an arrangement [under
Chapter xi] which is fair and equitable and in the best interest of unsecured creditors,
without some readjustment of the rights of stockholders such as . . . is precluded by Chap-
ter xr, is at best but negligible, and, if accomplished at all, must be without the aids to
protection of creditors and the public interest which are provided by Chapter x, and
which would seem to be indispensable to a just determination whether the plan is fair
and equitable." Id. at 453.
65. Dodd, supra note 64, at 748-9 (1940).
66. Cf. Sage v. Central R.R. of Iowa, 99 U.S. 334 (1878) where, over objections of
first mortgage bondholders, a foreclosure decree was upheld which contemplated purchase
of the property by the first mortgage trustee and, in accordance with wishes of a ma-
jority of the bondholders expressed pursuant to provisions of the mortgage, directed
conveyance of the property to a new company with stock participation being given to
junior unsecured creditors and stockholders. Participation was given them without any
new contribution and despite the fact that first mortgage bondholders had a $4,623,334
claim for principal and interest and for a master fund the property could sell for no more
than $2,500,000.
67. In Hackettstown National Bank v. D. G. Yuengling Brewing Co., 74 Fed. 110
(C.C.A.2d 1896), holders of three-quarters of the bonds, including the principal stock-
holder, attempted to suspend and postpone, for a period of six years, payment of interest
on the bonds and operation of the acceleration clause, with no impairment of stockholders'
interests.
In Rothschild v. Jefferson Hotel Co., 56 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Mo. 1944), an attempt
was made to effect a plan embracing creation of a lien prior to the first mortgage coupled
with payment to first mortgage bondholders of part of the principal and accrued interest,




to meet requirements of absolute priority.cS
Since it is clear that majority clauses recently adopted in this coun-
try, have been adopted for the purpose of forestalling, delaying, and
avoiding insolvency and bankruptcy reorganization," and since the
procedure adopted successfully avoids judicial scrutiny,0- the question
may be asked whether judicial aid should be extended to recognize or
enforce such agreements where creditors have assented in advance
to modification, during periods of financial difficulty, of their rights in
a manner which does not meet equitable or bankruptcy standards of
priority.7 ' One court has indicated that the priority rule might well
establish a standard that should be met before a mortgage trustee might
properly recommend modification of the interests of his bondholder
In In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 24 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Cal. 1938), an
attempt was made to effect a voluntary plan whereby bondholders of an insolvent company
would surrender their secured claim and receive 590,065 and stockholders 239,935 shares
of a new company although the stockholders made no new contribution (Id. at 503-5).
Subsequently when confirmation of this plan was sought in 77B proceedings, the plan
was altered so as to give bondholders an enlarged, and preferred, share participation
(Id. at 506). The Supreme Court held that even as so modified the plan could not be
approved and confirmed by a bankruptcy court. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products
Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
68. Since Canadian courts have not adopted as precise a standard of fairness and
equitableness as that adopted in the United States, Fraser, supra note 2, at 936, reorgan-
ization by use of majority clauses is limited only to the extent that a court "in granting
its approval to any plan of reorganization would give consideration to whether the plan
as a whole is such that members of the classes of security holders voting on it exercising
their own judgment as members of the class could reasonably approve." Courts considering
plans which allocate securities to junior interests ithout satisfaction of senior claims have
considere sudch facts as the junior interests being customers of the debtor (Letter of W.
Kaspar Fraser, KC., of the Ontario Bar, to the writer, July 10, 1947), consideration of
which, in light of the decision in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 105
(1939), would be regarded as irrelevant in the United States.
69. 57th I.C.C. ANx. REP. 76 (1943). See In re Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 64 F. Supp. 64
(E.D. Mo. 1945) ; Rothschild v Jefferson Hotel Co., 56 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Mo. 1944);
In re Georgian Hotel Corp., 82 F. 2d 917 (C.C.A. 7th 1936).
70. SEN. RFa,. No. 1619, op. cit. supra note 64, at 19; H. R. REP. No. 1016, op. cit.
supra note 56, at 56; Hearings before the subcommittec of the House Committee or In-
tersfate and Forcign Commerce on H. R. 2191 and 5220, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 285 (1939) ;
SEN. REP. No. 248, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-7 (1939); Note, 27 CoL L Rm. 579, 587
(1927).
71. Cf. Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U. S. 624 (1945) where, in approving a plan which
allocated securities to common stockholders without recognizing preferred stock liquida-
tion clauses, the court observed "No possibility exists that simplification of structure is
employed here to evade or nullify creditors' rights in reorganization or to take the place
of traditional reorganization." Id. at 634.
Even before enactment of the bankruptcy reorganization statutes, courts declined to
approve debt reduction plans which were inequitable in that stockholders surrendered
nothing although as many as ninety percent of the bondholders consented. See Lake Street
R1R. v. Ziegler, 99 Fed. 114 (C.C.A. 7th 1900).
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cestuis. 72 The Supreme Court has indicated tfiat the requirement ap-
plies to reorganization of solvent as well as insolvent companies 11 and
has approvingly quoted 74 the language of an early case that,
".. .any arrangement of the parties [to reorganization
proceedings] by which the subordinate rights and interests of
the stockholders are attempted to be secured at the expense of
the prior rights of either class of creditors comes within judicial
denunciation." 75
Sufficient doubt has already arisen in this country to cause those
proposing use of modification clauses, and trustees of bond issues
sought to be modified, to be concerned. Their concern is not limited
solely to 'consideration of compliance with formal requirements of a
majority clause 76 but extends ag well to consideration of the effective-
ness of action as against non-assenters 7
MAJORITY AcTION AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COIMISSION
In 1945 78 and again in 1947,'7 the ICC unsuccessfully proposed an
amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act 10 which would provide a
72. See Rothschild v. Jefferson Hotel Co., 56 F. Supp. 315, 321 n,5 (E.D. Mo. 1944).
In that case, modification of the indenture required, in addition to consent of the required
percentage of bonds, the recommendation of the trustee. Cf. Lake Street R.R. v. Ziegler,
99 Fed. 114, 129-30 (C.C.A. 7th 1900).
73. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 527 (1941) ; cf. Stone,
C.J. dissenting in Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624, 647-50 (1945).
74. Consolidated Rock Products Co. et al. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 527 (1941);
cf. Stone, C.J. dissenting in Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624, 647 (1945).
75. Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville N. A. & Chi. Ry., 174 U.S. 674, 684 (1899).
76. See the procedure followed in Rothschild v. Jefferson Hotel Co., 56 F. Supp.
315 (E.D. Mo. 1944); and National Trust Co. v. Maritime Coal, Ry. & Power Co.,
[1930] 2 D.L.R. 309 (N.S. Sup. Ct.). In the Los Angeles Lumber Products situation
steps were taken in 1930, under the majority clause, to reduce bond interest. In 1940
it was-successfully asserted that the formalities of the indenture had not been complied
with. Accordingly, under the final plan of reorganization, non-assenters of 1930 received a
greater participation. In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 46 F. Supp. 77, 85, 89
(S.D. Cal. 1941). This was done, curiously enough, despite an indenture provision
that ". . . no alteration shall be so made . . .which shall create any discrimination or
distinction whatever between any of the bonds secured . . . hereunder ... " Record on
Appeal, Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., p. 26 (1938).
77. See the procedure followed by the proponents of the plan in Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 110, 127-8 (1939).
78. S. 1253, as introduced, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) (hereafter cited as S. 1253)
See Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1253, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
1-134 (1946) (hereafter cited as Hearings on S. 1253).
79. S. 249, as introduced, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (hereafter cited as S. 249) and
H.R. 2298, as introduced, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (hereafter cited at H.R. 2298).
See Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 2298, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (,hereafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 2298) ; SEN. REP. No. 472,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); H.R. REP. No. 502 on H.R. 2298, 80th Cong., 1st Sess,
(1947).
80. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1943).
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modification procedure to be applicable to the obligations of "carriers"
defined in that Act s' Justification for the Commission proposal vas
based on the need for uninterrupted railroad operation,82 but, in mak-
ing it, the Commission showed scant regard for creditors' rights or for
the policy of existing corporate and railroad reorganization statutes.
Under the 1945 proposal a solvent s 3 carrier could be empowered to
alter or modify the provisions of a bond, note, debenture or other evi-
dence of debt,84 and the provisions of any instrument pursuant to which
such evidence of debt was issued. To be so empowered, the carrier
would first apply to the Commission. Following a hearing, on notice
to specified classes of security holders, the Commission could(as to the
original proposal, or with such amendments as the Commission should
find to be "just and reasonable") make prescribed findings.8 5 Unless
the proposal were then withdrawn by the carrier it would be submitted
to holders of the affected obligations ' and if the assent of holders of
75 per cent of each affected class were secured, an order would then be
entered approving and authorizing the proposal and fixing a time when
it should become binding on all holders of affected obligations.
81. Id. § 20a.
82. Hearings on S. 1253, at 22,32.
83. As originally proposed in 1945 the procedure would be available as to unmatured
securities of carriers "other than a carrier in equity receivership or in process of re-
organization under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act." S. 1253, at p. 3. The 1947 pro-
posals would be available as to the matured obligations of slch carriers. S. 249, at p.
.3 and H.R. 2298, at p. 3. Since, under § 77, failure to pay matured debts is a basis for
the filing, by creditors' holding five per cent of the carriers' debts, of an involuntary
petition it is doubtful if this change could successfully stave off § 77 proceedings if
sought by the creditors. Cf. SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S.
434 (1940).
84. The proposal was specifically inapplicable to equipment trust securities.
85. Under the 1945 and 1947 proposals the Commission would be required to find
that the proposed modification was (a) within the scope of the statute, (b) in the public
interest, (c) in the best interests of the carrier and the holders of each class of the obliga-
tions to be affected and (d) not adverse to the interests of any creditors of the carrier
not affected. If the modification should constitute "issuance of a security," as defined
in §20a(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STrT. 379 (18S7), as amended, 49
U.S.C. §§1-27 (1943), the Commission would also be required to make the findings re-
quired by that section.
There was, in detail, some differences in the findings required by the 1945 and 1947
proposals. While in the earlier proposals the Commission would be required to find that
the modification would "not be adverse to the interests of the holders of any other class
of the carriers' securities," the 1947 proposal would not require this but would require
as a further finding that the modification be in the best interests of each class of the
carriers' stockholders.
86. The 1945 and 1947 proposals specifically provided that the proxy provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1940) would
not be applicable, and the second of the 1947 proposals, H.R. 2293, provided that a modifica-
tion, found by the I.C.C. to come within § 20a(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT.
379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1943), would be exempt from the provisions
1948]
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While the ICC proposal was applicable to solvent carriers 87 and was
directed, in part, toward eliminating the "threat of financial difficul-
ties",88 and as a means of avoiding bankruptcy reorganization," it was
also directed toward securing, in accord with the public interest, such
modifications as elimination of antiquated or archaic provisions in
security instruments." In this combination of purposes there is a strong
similarity to the objectives of Section 11 of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act 91 requiring ad6pti6n of company or commission-spon-
sored plans for reorganization of registered holding companies so as
to secure elimination of unnecessary complexities in corporate struc-
ture, and fair and equitable distribution of voting power.92
More significantly, the ICC proposal evinces in many ways a solici-
tude for equity interests not found in Section 11. This is apparent in
the provisions made for (1) submission of only company-sponsored
plans,93 (2) withdrawal of any plan after Commission approval and/or
amendment 94 and, what may be the most serious criticism of the pro-
posal, (3) modification of creditors' interests with no impairment of
equity interests.
The result sought by the ICC proposal, alteration of the secured or
unsecured obligations of solvent carriers, has heretofore taken place
only under circumstances whereby each creditor, as against junior cred-
itors and equity interests, could insist on his contractual right, or could
exchange his contractual right for what he deemed a fair equivalent 11
-a result similar to what the absolute priority rule seeks to achieve in
bankruptcy reorganization. This the ICC proposal would modify,0
allowing 75 per cent of a class of creditors to modify, for all, the con-
of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1940).
87. While the 1947 proposals did contemplate instances where modification would
be sought of matured but unpaid obligations, such a condition, while not necessarily con-
stituting insolvency in the equity sense, cf. First National Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem,
290 U.S. 504 (1934), could be a basis for invoking §77. See note 83 supra.
88. See preambles to S. 1253, S. 249 and I-.R. 2298, 57th I.C.C. ANN. REP. 76 (1943).
I.C.C. ANN. RE,. 76 (1943).
89. Hearings on S. 1253, at 24, 511; Hearings on HR. 2298, at 28, 57th I.C.C. ANN.
REP. 76 (1943).
90. Hearings on S. 1253, at 8, 21; Hearings on H.R. 2298, at 10.
91. 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §79 (1943).
92. Id. at § 79k(b) (2).
93. S. 1253, at 3-4; S. 249, at 4; H.R. 2298, at 4.
94. S. 1253, at 5; S. 249, at 5; H.R. 2298, at 5.
95. This frequently takes the form of refunding or extension agreements. Sec Hear-
ings on H.R. 2298, at 41-2, 55-7.
96. The Commission did recognize that in bankruptcy reorganization creditors
claims must be fully satisfied before equity interests may participate. Hearings ont H.R.
2298, at 27; Hearings before special subcommittee of the Committee opp the Judiciary on
HR. 3237, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 178-9 (1947) (hereafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 3237);
Hearings on S. 249, at 529.
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tractual claims of non-assenters of that class against the solvent com-
pany.
Some observers have thought that the ICC proposal contemplated
modification in accordance with absolute priority requirements.Y There
is, however, substantial reason to believe that the proposal would ac-
complish a result in conflict with the requirementY' This possibility,
while never squarely stated by the Commission, has never been denied
by them. Negatively, the proposal makes no express provision for
formulation or approval of a plan which meets recognized priority re-
quirements,59 and, affirmatively, Commission insistence on certain fea-
tures of the proposal indicates that it contemplated implementation of
modifications which do not meet recognized priority requirements.
The proposal would allow modification of debt "obligations", as de-
fined.' Balloting would be only by, and a final Commission order
could only affect rights of, holders of the classes of "obligations"
affected. Of more significance is the Commission response to sugges-
tions that the percentage of assenting security holders be reduced. The
Commission must have been aware that under Section 11 of the Hold-
ing Company Act 101 reorganizations of solvent and insolvent com-
panies had been effected without submission to security holders, but
which gave participation to stockholders only after satisfaction of
97. Cf. Hearings on S. 249, at 563; Hearings on HR. 3237, at 186.
98. The Commission regarded the bill as a means of restoring railroad credit
without recourse to § 77, Hearings on S. 1253, at 124, and anticipated that creditors
could be expected to cooperate gladly to avoid the effects of a § 77 reorganization, Hcar-
ings on S. 249, at 519. Nevertheless, the Commission, and others, were aware that no
modification could be effected without stockholder acquiescence in the first instance, Hear-
ings on S. 1253, at 25, 250, that modifications would not affect them, id. at 711; Hearings
on S. 249, at 52, that they would be "very advantageous to them" Hearings on S. 1253,
at 78, and that they would "welcome such an arrangement," id. at 25. That the bill it-
self does not contemplate changing stockholder interests, see Hearings on S. 249, at 301-2
and Hearings on H.R. 2298, at 46, 52.
99. Compare the Commission findings required by the proposal, note 85 mspra, with
the provisions of § 11, 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1943). Under Chapter
XVof the Bankruptcy Act, 56 STAT. 787, 11 U.S.C. § 1200 ct seq. (1942) the Commission
was required to find that a proposed plan of adjustment vas "in the public interest and
in the best interests of each class of creditors and stockholders," id. at § 1210(2) (c) (i).
Nevertheless, the Commission avoided passing on the fairness of Chapter XV' proposals.
Midland Valley Ry., 254 I.C.C. 271, 281-2 (1943) ; Delauare & Hudson R.R., 254 I.C.C.
239, 240-1 (1943) with which compare Mahaffie and Eastman, Commissioners, dissenting
in Montana, Wyo. & So. R.R. 236 I.C.C. 325,338-9 (1939).
100. "... bonds, notes, debentures, or other evidences of indebtedness ... issued
under any mortgage, indenture, deed of trust, or other instrument of like nature, such
bonds, notes, debentures, or other evidences of indebtedness being hereinafter in this
section sometimes called 'obligations' .. .".. S. 1253, at 3; S. 249, at 3; HR. 2298, at 3.
101. 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1943) ; see the discussion of the Holding
Company Act cases in Hearings on S. 1253, at 128-30.
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creditors' claims. 0 2 Nevertheless, the ICC proposal would require, in
addition to conformity with other statutory requirements, the vote of
holders of 75 per cent of the affected class. Commission opposition to
reduction of this percentage was on the ground that the reasonableness
of the legislation depended, in part, on this percentage.0 3 Since utiliza-
tion of the Holding Company Act indicates that fair and equitable
reorganizations can be enforced without balloting of security holders,
it seems a reasonable conclusion that the ICC by its proposal sought
a constitutional or legal basis for reorganizations not of a "fair and
equitable" nature.
10 4
102. Thus, where assets had a total value of $2,625,000 and there were secured claims in
excess of $5,000,000, secured creditors received the new bonds and 95.76/o of the new stock.
The remaining 4.249o of the stock went to unsecured creditors as pan passu distribution of
free assets. Old stockholders received nothing. it re Jacksonville Gas Co., 46 F. Supp.
852 (S.D. Fla. 1942).
In a § 11 plan for a solvent company, cash and portfolio securities went to note and
debentureholders, 95% of the new common to holders of old prior preference and, because
of the likelihood of preferred stockholders participating, save for the intervention of the
§ 11 plan, in future earnings, they received the rest of the new stock. Old common
stockholders received nothing. In re Standard Gas & Electric Co., Holding Act Release
5430 (1944); nodified and approval denied, 59 F. Supp. 274 (D. Del. 1945) ; rev'd and re-
nsanded, 151 F.2d 326 (C.C.A. 3d 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 796 (1946).
103. Hearings on S. 249, at 301-2, 572-3. In advancing the original proposal in 1945
the Commission recognized that if the modification procedure was a reasonable exercise
of the Commerce power, Commissionmdirected modifications could be accomplished with-
out balloting, and indicated that provision for assent by security holders was to enhance
the reasonableness of the proposal, Hearings on S. 1253, at 124-5; cf. id. at 249. In 1947,
the Commission, in opposing a proposal that the required percentage of assents be reduced,
asserted, not that reduction would imperil constitutionality of its proposal, but that re-
duction would "place too large minorities at the mercy of the majorities." Hearings on
H.R. 3237, at 169; Hearings on S. 249, at 520.
104. "Fair and equitable" plans could be effected by coupling with modification, either
in the original proposal or in the form of a Commission amendment, such devices as in-
creases in interest rates paid on the carriers' securities, creation of sinking funds or re-
striction, or postponement, of dividends. Hearings on S. 1253, at 249; Hearings on S.
249, at 46. To the extent that equity interests were created and existed under state
law they could be altered by Commission order if they did not relate to matters essenA
tially of state concern and if continued existence would encumber interstate commerce
cf. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Daniel, 16 U.S.L. Week 4169 (U.S. Feb. 16, 1948);
Texas v. United States, 292 U.S. 522 (1934); Commonwealth & Southern Corp. v.
SEC, 134 F.2d 747, 752 (C.C.A. 3d 1943).
Amendments suggested to the I.C.C. proposal would make it clear that stockholders'
rights might be modified. See Hearings on H.R. 2298, at 53-63, 66-72; Hearings on S.
249, at 187-96, 203-11; H.R. 2298 as reported to the Senate Feb. 18, 1948; SEN. Rr. No.
897, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 10 (1948). If this suggested amendment be acceptable to the
Commission, it might well revamp the whole proposal, basing it squarely not on bankruptcy
precedents, but, on the Commerce clause-a suggestion made as early as 1929. Rodgers,
Rights and Duties of the Committee in Bondholders' Reorganizations, 42 HARV. L. R, 899,
919 (1929) ; cf. Craven and Fuller, The 1935 Amendments of the Railroad Bankruptcy Law,
49 HARv. L. REv, 1254, 1260 (1936) ; See Hearings before the House Judiciary Commit-
tee on H.R. 6249, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 261 (1935) (Luther Walter). Section 11 would
provide a suggestive precedent.
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Enactment of such a proposal may be objected to on more general
grounds. It can fairly be said that incorporation into all carrier securi-
ties 105 of what is essentially a majority clause would give statutory
dignity to a noa-statutory procedure already having recognized dan-
gers. It would also accord some degree of dignity to use of the non-
statutory analogue as a means of avoiding statutory reorganization
with its well-considered safeguards and sanctions. Under the commerce
clause, a plan of reorganization of a "public" corporation approved by
an administrative body can clearly be enforced without balloting of
security holders.05 Under the bankruptcy clause, a plan of reorganiza-
tion may be enforced without the approval of affected creditors.ler
However, this has been true only of statutes that require plans that
meet the test of fairness and equitableness.' Indeed, the Supreme
Court has indicated that even though more than 90 per cent of each
class of affected creditors approve a plan of reorganization, it cannot
be enforced in a Section 77 or Chapter X reorganization unless it is,
in fact, fair and equitable." 3
. These objections, together with the fact that the standard of fairness
and equitableness was incorporated into Section 11, and has been suc-
cessfully enforced by an administrative agency, strongly indicates, in
the absence of circumstances not presently apparent, that lack of such
105. Except equipment trust securities. See note 84 supra.
106. American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946); In re Consolidated
Electric & Gas Co., 55 F. Supp. 211 (D. Del. 1944); In re Community Power & Light
Co., 33 F. Supp. 901 (S.D. N.Y. 1940) ; see In re Standard Gas & Electric Co., 59 F. Supp.
274, 279 (D. Del. 1945) ("Congress can permit... an administrative agency... [to
alter creditors' rights] without creditors' vote when such is in the public interest. This
is because the Constitution confers bankruptcy power upon Congress and in the e.ercise
of that granted power Congress can, when it finds it necessary, alter such rights....
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such alteration is in the public interest.") reVd on other grounds, 151 F2d 326 (C.C.A.
3d 1945) cert. denicd, 327 U.S. 796 (1946). Cf. Note, 46 YATL L. J. 1041, 1042 (1937)
(suggesting police power as a basis).
107. As enacted in 1933, § 77 required the assent of tvo-thirds of a class to bind non-
assenters of that class. It was thereafter customary to provide for sale at an upset price
in the event that the required assent was not obtained. In 1935 this was revised by enact-
ment of the "cram-down" provision, providing that although the assent of two-thirds of
those voting is not obtained the plan may be confirmed without sale, if the judge should find
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amended, 11 U.S.C. § 205(e) ; See Craven and Fuller, supmra note 104, at 1276-83. The pro-
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108. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chi., M. St. P. & Pac. MR., 318 U.S. 523,
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a standard in the ICC proposal would constitute, as against non-as-
senters, an unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, impairment
of contract rights.11 Whether or not a successful modification were
ever accomplished under the statute, enactment would constitute in-
troduction of another incongruity "I into our statutory law of bank-
ruptcy. Accomplishment, under Section 11, of objectives similar to
those of the ICC proposal, and without the same dangers, suggests that
such incongruity is not necessary.
110. All reorganization precedents cited by advocates of the proposal are cases involv-
ing "fair and equitable" plans. See Hearings on S. 1253, at 116-7, 121-31; Hearings ot
H.R. 2298, at 63-6; H.R. RF.l. No. 502, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947) ; Hearings on S.
249, at 193-96.
111. Compare criticisms of Chapter XV in Will, Chapter XV of the Bankruptcy Act,
7 U. oF CH. L. REv. 203 (1940) with Will, The Voluntary Adjustment of Railroad Obli-
gations 7 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 519 (1940).
